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Summary findings
Sri Lanka's high unemployment rate has been attributed  protected by high tariffs or covered by job security
to a mismatch of skills, to queuing for public sector jobs,  regulations.
and to stringent job security regulations. But the  A time-series analysis of the impact of unemployment
empirical evidence supporting t:hese explanations is  on wage increases across sectors supports th:. hypothesis
weak.  that most of the unemployed are waiting for "good" job
Rama takes a fresh look at the country's  openings but are not interestecl in readily avsilable "bad'
unemployment problem, using individual records from  jobs.
the 1995 Labor Force Survey and time series for wages  In short, unemployment in Sri Lanka is lar Je!y
in the economy's formal and informal sectors.  voluntary. The problem is not a shortage of  iols but the
He assesses, and rejects, the skills mismatch hypothesis  artificial gap between good and bad jobs. Pol.icy  efforts
by comparing the impact of educational attainment on  should be aimed at reducing the gap betweeni good and
the actual wages of those who hiave  a job with the effect  bad jobs by making product markets more competitive,
on the lowest acceptable wages of the unemployed.  by reducing excessive job secutity, and by reforming
However, he finds substantial.  rents associated with  government policies on pay and employment.
jobs in the public sector and in private sector activities
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Sri Lanka  has experienced  two-digit  unemployment  rates for almost  three decades.
The available  estimates,  reported in the figure,  are not strictly  comparable  over the years
due to changes  in the criteria  chosen  to measure  unemployment  (especially  in 1981) and to
changes  in the coverage  of the survey  instrument  used to collect  the data.  But overall
these estimates  suggest  that the Sri Lankan  labor market does not work well. If they are
taken at face value,  the unemployment  rate was highest  in the early 1970s, at the heyday
of inward  orientation  and state-led  development  policies. In 1973, roughly  one in four
labor  market  participants  was out of a job.  Since  then, a series  of economic  reforms  have
been implemented,  including  the gradual liberalization  of foreign  trade, starting in 1977,
the creation of export processing  zones (EPZs), in 1978, and the privatization  of tea
plantations, initiated in  1992.  These reforms were associated with sustained output
growth, at an average  rate of almost  5 percent  per year, and with a gradual  decline  of the
unemployment  rate. However,  by 1997  one in ten labor  force participants  was still out of
a job.  Moreover,  four in five unemployed  people  had been seeking  a job for more than
one year. These figures  are a source of concern  not only for economic  reasons, but also
because of their political implications. Frustration  over jobs was at the roots of two
violent  uprisings  by educated  youth, in 1971  and 1987-89. Some  fear similar  events  in the
future if nothing  is done to bring  unemployment  rates down.
Over  the years,  several  explanations  have  been proposed  for high  unemployment  in
Sri Lanka. One of the most influential  is the "skills  mismatch"  hypothesis,  first articulated
by the International  Labour  Organisation  (Seers, 1971). According  to this hypothesis,  the
1Sri Lankan education system produces  skills that  are not  valued by  employers, while
raising the expectations of those who acquire them.  As a result, the unemployed are not
interested by the existing vacancies, whereas the employers are not willing to fill tleni  with
the available candidates.  The mismatch is considered to be particularly severe f:)r those
who are just coming out of school, and have no work experience. The practical remedy to
the unemployment problem, if the skills misrnatch hypothesis is correct, is to  reform the
education system and to supplement it with vocational training geared to the needs of the
labor market.  Vocational training programs of this sort, the argument goes, would make
the unemployed mrore  "employable".
A second explanation focuses on public sector employment and pay policies.  This
explanation was p:roposed by Glewwe (1987) and discussed in more detail by Dickens and
Lang (1996).  In many countries, public sector jobs are characterized by more stability,
higher benefits, lower effort and more prestige than their private sector counterparts.  In
Sri Lanka, they are also characterized by higher pay.  Labor market entrants thus face an
incentive to wait for job openings in the public sector.  Some of them would rather remain
inactive than take the available jobs out of the public sector.  Others would be willing to
take  a  "bad"  job  while waiting for  a  "good"  one,  if  it  was  not  for  the  perceived
government preference for  hiring the unemployed.  Dickens  and Lang  claim ihat Sri
Lankan public sector jobs are actually created with the deliberate purpose of alle4.ating
the  unemployment:  problem.  Based  on  this  second explanation, a  credible relibrm of
public sector recruitment  and pay policies would be the most effective way to  reduce
unemployment,  because it would discourage the "queuing" attitude.
2Finally, a  third explanation emphasizes the  wedge between  "good"  and "bad"
private sector jobs resulting from Sri Lankan labor market regulations, and especially from
the Termination of Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) Act (TEWA), passed in
1971 (Rama, 1994).  The TEWA states that a worker who has spent one year or more
with the  same employer and has  not  committed a  disciplinary fault  cannot be  legally
dismissed, except with the consent of the Commissioner of Labour.  The process leading
to this consent may take years, during which the firm has to keep paying the salaries of the
redundant worker.  If and when the authorization is granted, the required compensation
may amount to several years of salary.  However, many workers are not subject to the
TEWA.  Firms with less than 15 workers are not legally subject to it.  Other firms, and
particularly those in the EPZs, find ways around it. As a result, some private sector jobs
are precarious whereas others are almost for life.  It would not  be  surprising if many
among the unemployed were willing to queue for the latter jobs, but unwilling to take the
former.  According to  this explanation, less stringent firing regulations enforced more
evenly across firms and sectors would reduce the wedge between "good" and "bad" jobs,
thus reducing the incentive to remain unemployed.
While all three explanations are appealing, the evidence to support them is mostly
outdated  and  often weak.  Consider the "skills mismatch" hypothesis.  Glewwe used
individual data to  generate a profile of the unemployed.  His results showed that  the
likelihood of  being unemployed increased steadily with  educational attainment, which
could be  consistent  with  the  skills mismatch hypothesis. But  his  data  were  from  a
population  census  of  1970-71,  which  may  be  inappropriate  to  assess  today's
unemployment problem.  Dickens and Lang, in turn, questioned the role of education in
3explaining  unemployment, using results from a household survey carried out in 1985-86.
They claimed that among young males, the unemployment rate was highest for those with
five to  seven years  of  education.  Since this  was  less  than  the  median  educational
attainment  for  this  group,  they  concluded  that,  if  anything,  unemployment  was
concentrated among those  with relatively little education, which contradicts  the  skills
mismatch hypothesis. But their analysis was based on aggregate data, and did not co:ntrol
for other individual  characteristics. More recently, Aturupane (1997) showed that private
returns to schooling were high, especially at the highest levels of education.  This finding
suggests that the Sri Lankan education system is relatively well geared towards the labor
market.  The skills rnismatch hypothesis could still be valid, however, if schooling raised
earnings  expectations  even  more  than  it  raises  actual  earnings.  Unfortunately,  no
empirical evidence is available  in this respect.
A similar problem arises with the alleged gap between "good"  and "bad" jobs,
which  is central to  the  two  other explanations of unemployment.  There  is  no  hard
evidence to support the claim that public sector jobs are more attractive than their pirivate
sector counterparts.  Glewwe compared average earnings across  sectors and  skills, to
show that the goverrnment  pays more than the private sector.  But his comparison wiis for
broad groups of workers, such as clerks, not for individuals with similar characteristics.
Moreover, the data were for 1969, and relative earnings might have changed since then.
Other comparisons involved similar positions in the public and the private sector (Bcwen,
1990).  While interesting, these  comparisons lack  generality and  only involve private
sector jobs in full ccompliance  with labor market regulations, i.e. good private jobs  As
regards the higher job security stemming from the TEWA, it could in fact be paid fi:,r  by
4the workers themselves, through lower salaries.  A small survey of private sector firms
suggests that at least some of the burden falls on employers, who complain bitterly about
the TEWA (World Bank, 1993).  But no systematic comparison of labor earnings in jobs
covered and not covered by the TEWA is currently available.
The aim of this paper is to  take a fresh look at the Sri Lankan unemployment
problem,  by  assessing the  three  explanations  summarized above,  and  deriving  the
implications for economic policy.  Most of the analyses in the paper rely on individual
records from the 1995 Labor Force Survey. Time series on wages in sectors covered and
not covered by the TEWA are used as well.  The next section reviews the criteria used to
measure unemployment in Sri Lanka.  It  shows that the official unemployment rate is
comparable to that of other countries.  It also shows that the decline of young population
cohorts  in  the  coming years  will  only  lead  to  a  modest  decline of  the  aggregate
unemployment rate.  Section 3 presents a detailed profile of the unemployed. It identifies
how individual characteristics such as age, gender or  educational attainment affect the
probability of being unemployed.  Section 4 deals with the skills mismatch hypothesis, by
comparing how educational attainment affects the labor earnings of those who have a job
and the lowest acceptable wage of those who are searching one.  The results suggest that
the education system is not behind the high unemployment rates of Sri Lanka.  Section 5
measures the earnings gap between "good" and "bad" jobs.  It supports the hypothesis
that those who work for the public sector, or in activities protected by high tariffs, earn
much more than other workers. Those who have been in their job for more than one year,
and are therefore more likely to be covered by the TEWA, earn more as well.  Section 6
uses aggregate data on wages over time to evaluate the hypothesis that the unemployed
5are waiting for "good" job openings, but not interested in readily available "bad" jolbs  It
shows that high unemployment rates reduce the growth rate of wages negotiated through
collective bargaining, but  have no influence on the growth  rate  of daily wages iin the
informal sector of the economy.  The policy implications of the analysis are deri,ed  in
section 7.  Aggregal:e  data are used in this section to identify recruitment patterns by the
public sector.  Microeconomic data  are used  to  generate  a  profile  of  public  sector
employees.  The results clearly indicate that the actual hiring practices of the government
are at odds with its stated policies.  Section 8 concludes.
2.  Measuring  Unemployment
The main instrument to  measure and analyze unemployment in Sri Lanka is the
Labor Force Survey, produced by the Department of Census and Statistics.  This survey,
identified as LFS hereafter, covers the whole island except for the Northem and EELstern
provinces, which  are the  two  most  severely affected by the  armed  conflict witllt the
separatist Tamil "tigers".  The LFS covers a total of 4,000 households per quarter, over
two  rounds.  These households are selected based  on a  two-stage  stratified sanpling
procedure with no rotation.  A new random sample is therefore drawn each quarter.  AVIDst
of the  analyses in this paper are based  on combined individual records  from the  four
quarters in 1995.  This was the most recent year for which data were available whell tihe
research started.
The LFS questionnaire is designed according to internationally accepted pracices.
In some developing countries, unemployment rates can be inflated due to a somewhat lax
6interpretation of what job  seeking means.  In Tunisia, for  example, housewives who
declare to be willing and available to take a job, but do not take any practical step to find
one, may be counted as unemployed (Rama, 1998).  In Sri Lanka, by contrast, the LFS
would count any person who does not have a job and did not take any action to find one
in the week preceding the survey as economically inactive (DCS,  1990).  Similarly, in
some  developing  countries  a  person  who  works  irregularly  could  be  considered
unemployed.  In Sri Lanka, a single hour of work over the week preceding the survey is
enough to be counted as employed. It follows that the high unemployment reported of Sri
Lanka is not a statistical artifact.
The unemployment rate does not change much when the previous year, instead of
the  previous  week,  is  used  as  the  reference  period to  decide  whether  a  person  is
unemployed.  The LFS contains questions about work and job  seeking in each of  the
twelve months preceding the survey.  Based on the answers, the interviewer classifies the
person as "usually employed", "usually unemployed" or "usually not econonically active".
The rate that can be calculated based on this information, called annual broad rate in what
follows, is similar to the one estimated based on the previous week only, which will be
called the weekly broad rate.  For instance, in the 1995 LFS sample the unemployment
rate of the working-age population was 12.9 percent if the annual broad  definition was
used, compared to 13.6 percent according to the weekly broad definition.
Moreover, the  similarity of the two unemployment rates holds for  every group
within the working age population.  Table 1 compares these rates across the  1995 LFS
sample for different age groups, by gender.  It shows that broad unemployment figures do
not differ much depending on whether they are calculated on a weekly basis or an annual
7basis.  The figures are extremely high among young individuals, but decline sharply for
those above 30 years of age.  Similar  breakdowns by education, household status and type
of  district  (urban,  rural or  agricultural  estates)  confirm the  similarity of  these  two
unemployment  rates across all population groups.
When  more  restrictive  definitions  are  used,  the  unemployment  rate  drops
dramatically for  all  population  groups.  One  of  such  definitions entails  counting  as
unemployed only those individuals who did not work in the week  preceding the survey
and declared that they would be willing to take "any job", meaning by that either a full-
time job  or a part-time job.  This will be called the weekly narrow definition in what
follows.  Based on this definition, the unemployment rate of the 1995 LFS sample would
be 3.17 percent.  Table 1 shows that the unemployment rate would remain high only for
those aged 15 to 24.
The  contrast  between  high  unemployment  rates  among  youth,  and  low  or
negligible  rates among the rest of the population suggests that changes in the age structure
of the population could significantly  alter the aggregate unemployment rate.  In Sri LaLnkza,
young population cohorts are becomning  smaller due to the decline of birth rates oven the
last  few  years  (Kiribanda,  1997).  Could  this  demographic  trend  "solve"  the
unemployment problem,  even if  the  efficiency of  the  labor  market  did  not  impr-ove
fundamentally? Probably not.  If labor force participation rates and unemployment l ates
for all age and gender groups remained unchanged at their 1995 levels, the unemployrient
rate would only decline by 2 percentage points in the next 20 years, to reach rougElly  8
percent of the labor force by 2015.  However, the demographic trend does not explaii t:he
gradual decline of the unemployment rate observed since the 1970s either.  This is because
8young population cohorts started shrinking only very recently.  The observed decline in
the unemployment rate thus reflects a genuine improvement in labor market conditions,
rather than a composition effect.
3.  A Profile of the Unemployed
Unemployment  rates are highest among the youth, but is it because they are young,
because they are more educated, or because they benefit from family support to perform
an  extended job  search?  Age, education and position in the  household being highly
correlated, partial analyses such as that in table 1 cannot really answer this question.  A
more  rigorous  assessment  requires  considering  all  of  the  observable  individual
characteristics simultaneously. These characteristics are summarized in table 2, for both
the employed and the unemployed. Because some of the analyses on the paper focus on
wage earners only, one of the columns in the table refers to this latter group specifically.
Also,  because  of the difference  in unemployment  rates depending  on whether  the broad or
the  narrow definition is  used, the  table reports the  average characteristics  of  the
unemployed  under  both definitions.
The results of a series of Probit regressions  linking  unemployment  to  individual
characteristics  are reported in tables 3 and 4.  All regressions  are estimated  on individual
records from the 1995  LFS. In the regressions  in table 3 the dependent  variable  takes the
value of one if the person is unemployed  according  to the weekly broad definition  of
unemployment,  and the value of zero if the person is employed. The results are similar  if
the annual  definition  of unemployment  is used instead  (these  results are not reported in the
9paper).  In the regressions in table 4 the dependent variable takes the value of one if the
person is unemployed according to the weekly narrow definition of unemployment.
Age turns out to be an important determinant of unemployment.  The probability
of being out of a job is highest for the youth, and declines rapidly with age.  Under the
quadratic  specification  adopted  for  the  age  variable,  the  unemployment  probability
increases  again  as  individuals grow  old.  At  the  sample  mean,  the  unemployment
probability is lowest around age 50 in urban and rural districts, and  around age 45 in
agricultural estates.  The results are similar regardless of the definition of unemployment
used.
Other  determinants vary  substantially depending on  whether the  broad  or  the
narrow definition of unemployment is used.  Based on the weekly broad  definition, the
probability of being unemployed is higher among the sons and daughters of the household
head, particularly in urban areas.  Unemployment  is also more prevalent among those with
secondary  education.  In  both  urban  and  rural  districts,  the  probability  of  bezing
unemployed is highest among those with 0  and A levels (equivalent to  10 and 12 years of
education respectively). In  urban districts, the  lowest  probability of  unemploymert  is
found among individuals with university degrees.  This result could be  due to  a  Ihigh
demand for graduates by the private sector.  However, it may also reflect the pecL,liar
hiring policies of the government, as will be  suggested below.  If the weekly nar-ow
definition of unemployment is used instead, sons and daughters are not more likely to l)e
unemployed than household heads.  And unemployment appears to  be more preva.lent
among those who only have one to five years of schooling.
10The results in tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the view that many among the
unemployed are the children of caring, relatively well to  do families.  Young educated
individuals who live with their parents are more likely to be unemployed according to the
weekly broad definition, but they are not eager to take "any job",  as the weekly narrow
definition would  imply.  Their  ability to  stay  out  of  a job  probably stems  from  the
willingness  of Sri Lankan families to support their offspring over long periods of time.  In
fact, 94 percent of the unemployed surveyed by the LFS declare that their main source of
income during their job search is family support, compared to only 1 percent who receive
some government assistance.
Studies on  poverty in  Sri Lanka  are  consistent with  this  view  as  well.  The
distribution of unemployment rates by household income is bimodal, with a first peak at
low levels of income, a decline for intermediate levels, and  a second, higher peak at high
income levels (Alailima, 1991).  The pattem is similar in urban and rural districts.  The
first peak probably reflects "involuntary" unemployment,  with low family income being the
result of a jobless household head.  The second one is likely to reflect a voluntary choice,
with the unemployment of young household members being afforded by relatively high
family income. Given the length of unemployment spells, if the bulk of unemployment was
involuntary, there should be a strong association between poverty and joblessness.  The
labor market characteristics of the heads of poor households indicate that this is not the
case: low labor earnings are a more important factor than unemployment in explaining
poverty (The World Bank, 1990, 1992).
114.  The Skills Mfismatch  Hypothesis
The skills  mismatch  hypothesis  supposes  that educated  workers expect better jobs
than they can actually  have access to.  Data on the expectations  and true prospects of
those who are out of a job can be used to evaluate  this hypothesis. The LFS asks the
unemployed  to repoirt  their lowest acceptable  wage.  This wage can be compared  to the
labor earnings  of individuals  who  have similar  characteristics,  but happen  to have a job. If
the skills  mismatch  hypothesis  is correct, the gap between  the lowest acceptable  wage and
the  actual labor earnings of otherwise similar individuals  should increase with their
educational  attainment.
A crude comparison  between  lowest acceptable  wages  and average  labor earnings
is presented  in table 5. The figures  in each cell  are the ratios between  the average  lowest
wage reported by the unemployed  in that cell and the average labor earnings observed
among  employed  workers in the same cell.  The absolute  level of these ratios should  be
interpreted  with caution. In particular,  the LFS does not collect  information  on the labor
earnings  of the self-employed,  but only of salaried  workers. In developing  countries,  inost
of the self-employed  are in the informal  sector,  where  productivity  and pay tend to be low.
Sri Lanka should  be no exception  in this respect. As a result, average  labor earnings  mnay
be over-estimated,  and the absolute  level of the ratios  in table 5 over-estimated. Still,  the
variation  of these ratios across  different  population  groups  is informative.
The ratios in table 5 decline  steadily  with age. This pattern is observed  across all
population  groups,  in both urban and rural districts. It is observed  under  both the wcelly
broad and the weekly  narrow definitions  of unemployment.  Table  5 also shows  that tiicse
12who are willing to take "any job", meaning by that either part time or full time, are willing
to  accept lower wages.  For almost all population groups and all districts, the ratios in
table 5 are lower under the weekly narrow definition of unemployment than under the
weekly broad definition.
To  the  extent  that  younger  population  cohorts  are  more  educated  than  their
predecessors,  the  age  pattern  in  table  5  seems  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that
education leads to unrealistic wage expectations.  However, a more rigorous assessment
of this hypothesis requires educational attainment to  be  explicitly considered. Table  6
reports  the coefficients of regressions explaining both  the actual labor earnings of the
employed and the lowest acceptable wage of the unemployed as a function of a variety of
individual characteristics, including educational attainment.  To  make these regressions
comparable, individual characteristics that  are not  observable for both  groups, such as
work experience or occupation, are set aside. The fit of the regression is good for actual
labor earnings, but poor  for the lowest  acceptable wage.  The hypothesis that  all the
coefficients are the same in the first and the third columns is strongly rejected by the data,
as indicated by the Chow test.  One possible explanation for this rejection is that the data
on the lowest acceptable wages are unreliable.  Measurement error  in the independent
variable biases the estimated coefficients towards zero.  However, the coefficients on age
and gender are simnilar  to those obtained using data on actual wages, which suggests that
the data on lowest acceptable wages do contain information.
According to  the results in table 6, educational attainment increases actual labor
earnings more  than  it  raises  wage  expectations.  The  education  coefficients in  the
regression on actual labor earnings are all statistically significant, and they become larger
13with the number of years of schooling.  For instance, an average worker  with A levels
earns about two  hundred percent more than a similar worker with  no education at all
(lOOx(exp(l.1049)-]) = 201.9).  This gap corresponds to an average curmulative  gain of
almost 10 percent per year of education. Vocational training also leads to higher earnings,
with the gain amounting to more than 9 percent per year.  Consequently, there is nothing
in table  6 to  suggest that the  education system of Sri Lanka, in  spite of all its  flaws,
performs  worse  than  that  of  other  developing  countries  that  have  much  lower
unemployment rates.
It could be argued that high returns to education reflect distorted government pay
policies, rather than higher labor productivity. In many developing countries, public sector
pay is based on diplomas, even if those who hold them are not really more knowledgeable
or  productive than those  who do  not.  The inclusion of public sector workers  in the
regression on actual labor earnings would then bias the education coefficients upwards.
But when the regression is run for private sector workers only the results do not change
substantially, as showm  by the second column in table 6.  On the other hand, the education
coefficients in the regression on lowest acceptable wages are not significantly diffiXrmnt
from zero.  It follows that the gap between the lowest acceptable wage and the average
wage for workers wiith  similar characteristics decreases with education, thus contradir,ting
the skills mismatch hypothesis.
Other  studies on education and employment tend to  reject the skills misniatch
hypothesis as well.  Ciunatilleke  (1989) compared the education levels of the output C 1the
educational system and of the net change in employment. He concluded that there wEis  no
substantial difference between the two.  Kelly and Culler (1990) interviewed private sector
14managers to assess whether they viewed the shortage of qualified  labor as a major obstacle
to the development of their enterprises. Most of the interviewees said that workers knew
how to do their jobs, and acknowledged that there were plenty of good workers available.
There is also abundant anecdotal evidence to  suggest that Sri Lankan workers learn fast
and are easy to train.
5.  Good  versus  Bad  Jobs
Two of the explanations proposed for the high unemployment rates of Sri Lanka
rest on the assumption that some jobs are much more attractive than others.  One of the
explanations emphasizes the divide between the public sector and the rest of the economy.
Public sector jobs  are usually more secure than other jobs.  They also provide higher
benefits, such as old-age pension, and require lower effort levels.  Some times, they also
carry more prestige.  Consequently, for workers to be indifferent between public sector
jobs and other jobs, the former should pay substantially  less than the latter.  Whether they
actually do so in Sri Lanka can be assessed by comparing the labor earnings of similar
workers in and out of the public sector, based on data from the LFS.  A dummy variable
that takes the value of one for public sector workers is used in the analysis. Because the
sectoral classification in the LFS rests on the establishment the interviewee works in, the
public sector comprises state-owned enterprises in addition to government administration.
In 1995, tea estates were still counted as part of the public sector.
Another  explanation  of  high  unemployment emphasizes the  much higher job
security enjoyed by those workers who are covered by the TEWA.  Again, in  a well-
15functioning labor market, workers who benefit from higher  job  security could be expected
to  earn less than other, similar workers do.  Lower pay would be the price to  pay for
higher job  stability.  But in practice, the difficulty to  fire permanent workers may give
them a substantial leverage to raise their wages, particularly in unionized firms.  Whether
the workers covered by the TEWA earn more or less than similar workers with no job
security can be assessed based on the 1995 LFS.  The TEWA only covers workers who
have been for at least one year with the same employer, provided that the firm has  15
employees or more.  The LFS asks the number of months the interviewee has spent in the
same job (DCS, 1990).  Unfortunately, it does not report the size of the firm, nor does it
indicate whether the interviewee or the firm is unionized. But someone who has been with
the same employer for at least one year is more likely to be covered by the TEWA.  A
dummy variable that takes the value of one for workers with a seniority of at least one
year is therefore used as a proxy for coverage.
Finally, studies done for other countries suggest that pay is higher in sectors where
competition in product markets is limited. In a small country like Sri Lanka, trade barriei  s
are a potentially important obstacle to  competition.  Due to  the scale of the economrn,
firmns  operating in protected sectors probably enjoy a significant market power.  In a we il-
functioning labor market, this  market power would  translate into higher payments  :o
capital.  But  the  evidence elsewhere indicates that  rent  sharing between workers  arid
employers is common.  Whether Sri Lanka is an exception can be assessed by comparirig
labor earnings across sectors with different levels of protection.  The sectoral breakdown
of the 1995 LFS being quite detailed, it is possible to match each of the sectors with tile
corresponding tariff rate, as calculated by the World Trade Organization (WTO, 1995) f:r
16the same year.  A zero tariff rate is imputed to non-tradable sectors, but a dummy variable
is introduced for each of them.  Non-tradable sectors might be characterized by limited
competition in product markets.  If no dummy variable was introduced  for them, the
estimated effect of trade protection on pay would be biased downwards (in some sectors,
a zero tariff rate could be associated with relatively high pay).
Table 7 reports the results of regressions explaining  the log of monthly earnings as
a  function  of  both  individual and job  characteristics.  The  individual characteristics
considered are the  same as in  the  previous  section, plus total  work  experience and
occupation. Job characteristics include whether the employer is the public sector, whether
the interviewee has been with the same employer for one year or more, and the tariff rate
protecting the sector (plus a dummy variable for each of the non-tradable sectors).  A
dummy variable for payments in kind is also included in the  specification.  The LFS
reports whether the interviewee receives payments in kind, but does not assess how much
these payments are worth.  In a well-functioning labor market, the coefficient on this
dummy variable would provide information on the cash value of the average payment in
kind.  For instance, according to table 7 urban workers who receive payments in kind get
17 percent less cash (lOOx(exp(-0.1816)  - 1) = -16.6) than those who do not.  Therefore,
at the sample mean the value of the payments in kind could roughly represent 17 of the net
compensation.
The results in table 7 suggest that the earnings gap between public sector jobs and
other jobs is substantial. Based on the coefficients in the fourth column of the table, public
sector workers earn roughly 60 percent more (I  OOx(exp(O.4673)  - 1) = 59.6) than similar
workers  in similar jobs  out  of the public sector.  Strictly speaking, this would be  the
17earnings  gap  at  the  sample  mean,  i.e.  for  a  worker  with  the  average  individual
characteristics of the LFS sample, with the average job seniority of the sample, in a sector
protected by the average tariff of the sample.  The earnings gap  appears to  be  slightly
higher in rural districts.  It could be as high as 112 percent for the average worker and the
average job in estates.
The results in table 7 also suggest that workers who are covered by the TEWA
earn more than those wrho  are not.  In addition to job security, covered workers would get
34 percent more cash (  lOOx(exp(O.2944)  - 1) = 34.2) in the country as a whole, and 102'
percent more cash in estate  districts.  Again, these comparisons are valid at the sample
mean.  Finally, the  results indicate that  higher tariff rates  translate  into  higher labor
earnings both in urban and rural districts. In urban districts, for instance, sectors protected
by the maximum tariff rate of 35 percent pay, other things equal, 39 percent more than
sectors protected by a 10 percent tariff rate (lOOx(exp(O.013  lx(35 - 10)) - 1) = 38.7).
One of the most obvious criticisms  to the results in table 7 is that workers are l or;
randomly allocated across sectors, but rather selected into them.  Suppose, for instan,e,
that the public sector manages to  attract  and retain "better"  workers than the privw.te
sector.  In this case, the estimated public sector wage premium should not be interpret c:
as a  rent.  Studies on earnings differentials done for  other developing countries have
addressed  this  potential  self-selection bias  in  a  variety  of  ways  (Van  der  Gaag  a id
Vijverberg, 1988; Terrell, 1993; Mengistae, 1999).  A relatively straightfonvard approa,A,
is adopted here.  It is assumed that the probability for someone living in a specific distri  ci.
to work for the public sector, or to be covered by the TEWA, increases with the share of
18the district's jobs that are in the public sector, or covered by the TEWA. But these shares
should not affect the earnings gaps between  jobs.
The regressions in table 8 re-estimate the determinants of labor earnings using
district-level data  on  the  public sector  share  of employment, and  on  the  fraction  of
workers with a seniority of one year or more, to instrument the public sector job  and the
seniority variables.  Depending on the specifications, one or both instruments are used,
and  one  or  both  explanatory variables are instrumented (details  are  provided in  the
footnote).  The results  show that  the public sector wage  premium remains large and
statistically significant, whereas the premium associated with TEWA coverage becomes
insignificant. This drop suggests that the private sector offers  job security to workers who
are "better" than the average.  On the other hand, the similarity of the public sector wage
premia in tables 7 and 8 implies that public sector workers are just average.
Other analyses  were carried out to check the robustness of the public sector wage
premium.  Firstly, all the regressions were re-estimated using the log of hourly earnings,
instead of monthly earnings, as the dependent variable.  The results, not  reported here,
remained basically  unchanged.  Secondly,  the sample was split based on educational levels.
The results in table 7 could be criticized on the grounds that the LFS questionnaire has
only four digits for the earnings variable, so that  108 workers (out of 7,013) appear to
earn 9,999 rupees per month.  Most of them probably earn more than that.  If very high
earnings were more common out of the public sector than in it, which is plausible, the
coefficient on the public sector dummy would be over-estimated.  Splitting the sample by
education levels allows dealing with this censorship problem, because almost all of the
workers reporting monthly earnings of 9,999 rupees have university degrees.  The results
19in table 9 show that the earnings gaps remain roughly unaffected for workers with up to A
levels, but  are much less significant for workers with  university degrees.  Given that
almost one third of the latter are affected by the censorship of the earnings variable, there
are no solid grounds to claim that workers with university degrees earn more in the putilic.
sector than out of it.  However, according to table 8 public sector jobs are very attracti ve
at low education levels.  For instance, workers with 5 years of schooling or less earn 94
percent more in the public sector than out of it (1OOx(exp(0.6628)  - 1) = 94.0).
Based on these results, it is safe to conclude that jobs  covered by the TEWA do
not pay less, and jobs in the public sector pay more, than other jobs.  Since they also carry
more benefits, they have to be perceived as being more attractive.  When confronted to
this  finding, some  Sri Lankan  observers  object  that  public sector  jobs  are  not  that
attractive compared to  "good" private sector jobs.  However, this  casual observation is
not incompatible with tlhe statistical findings described above.  A job in the private sect or
can be very attractive, particularly if this is a permanent job in a sector protected by high
tariffs. It can certainly be more attractive than some public sector jobs.  And it probably is
for those with university degrees.  But for less educated workers, most public sector jo ts
would still be "good" compared to other salaried jobs, and especially to temporary private
sector jobs.  These  are  the jobs  most  of  the  unemployed  seem  reluctant  to  talke
immediately upon their entry in the labor force.
206.  Unemployment  and Wage Dynamics
Another  way of assessing  whether some  jobs are more attractive  than others is to
compare  the effects  of unemployment  on wage increases  across sectors.  It is generally
accepted  that high  unemployment  rates  translate  into lower  wage increases,  at least in the
short run. The relationship  between  these  two variables,  also known  as the Phillips  curve,
has been corroborated  by studies done for many  countries,  over a variety  of periods. A
plausible  interpretation  of this relationship  is that the employed  are more concerned  about
competition  for their  jobs in periods  of high  unemployment,  and are therefore  more  willing
to -accept  more modest pay increases. Consider,  however, a segmented  labor market,
where good jobs are scarce whereas bad jobs abound,  and where the unemployed  are
seeking  good jobs only. In such a labor market,  a high unemployment  rate would be a
source of concern  to those who have good jobs, but it would be basically  irrelevant  to
those who have bad jobs.  Therefore,  a Phillips  curve could be expected  for the wages
paid  by good  jobs, but not for those  paid  by bad  jobs.
In Sri Lanka, most of the jobs covered  by the TEWA are in activities  subject  to
collective  bargaining  agreements.  There are 37 tri-partite  Wage Boards  that set minimum
wages for each skill  level  by sector. Delegates  to these Boards are chosen from among
major sectoral trade unions and active sectoral guilds of private employers by  the
Commissioner  of Labour.  The resulting  agreements  also provide the "floor" for direct
negotiations  between trade unions and employers,  such as the one between the Ceylon
Mercantile  Workers  Union  and some  fifty  firms  represented  by the Employers'  Federation
21of Ceylon. The average:  minimum  wage set by the Wage Boards can therefore be seen as a
proxy for the average wage paid by the "formal" sectors of the economy.
Workers hired on a daily basis, on the  other hand,  are not  directly affected by
collective  bargaining agreements. Although these agreements apply in principle to all firms
in the corresponding sector (including state corporations), they are only enforced in the
formal sector of the economy. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka collects infonnation on the
daily wages of casual workers in a variety of occupations in the tea, paddy, rubber and
construction sectors.  Some 80 teachers scattered across the island report this information
to the Central Bank on ia  monthly basis. With it, the Central Bank produces wage indexes
for the informal sector.  These indexes can be seen as an indicator of the average wage
paid in "informal" activities.
Time series on the average minimum wage set by Wage Boards and the average
pay of casual workers  e  stimated by the Central Bank can be used to  estimate a Phillips
curve for Sri Lanka.  This was first done by Rama (1994), using annual data from the
1980-1992 period.  Table 10 updates the estimates using data up to  1997. The analysis n
this table considers seven sectors, three of them "formal" and the rest "informal".  Formn  al
sector wages are based on the average minimum  wage set by Wage Boards for agricultur,
manufacturing and construction, and services.  Informal sector wages are based on ti ie
average daily rate calculated by the Central Bank for casual workers in tea, paddy, rubbi r
and  construction.  All four  specifications in  table  9 control  for  the  inflation rate  (Ls
measured by the consumer price index for Colombo) and the unemployment rate in tle
same year.  But  they  differ in  the  treatment  of the  unemployment variiable and tle
independent term.  Other regression analyses, not reported in the paper, also allowed f:nr
22varying time lags, and relied on different measures of inflation (the GDP deflator) and
unemployment (urban and rural). The main results were similar.
Column (1)  in  table  10  estimates  a  Phillips curve  without  introducing  any
differentiation  across sectors.  In this specification,  the unemployment rate does not have a
statistically significant effect on wage increases.  All of the other columns allow for a
different effect of the unemployment rate depending on whether the sector is formal or
informal.  Although  the  point  estimates  vary  across  columns,  they  all  show  that
unemployment rates have no  effect on informal sector wages,  but  exert  a  downward
pressure on formal sector wages.  This pressure is captured by the statistically significant
coefficient on the variable that  interacts the unemployment rate with the formal sector
dummy.  What varies across columns (2) to (4) in table  11 is the  specification of the
independent term.  Column (2) imposes the same independent term on all seven sectors;
column (3) allows for a different independent term in the formal and informal sector; and
column (4) for a different independent  term for each of the seven sectors considered.
The results  in table  10 provide additional support  to  the  hypothesis that  the
unemployed are in search of good jobs, like those covered by Wage Board  agreements,
but are not interested in bad jobs, like those available on a daily basis.  The results are also
compatible with anecdotal evidence that vacancies abound for bad jobs.  For  instance,
agricultural estates  have difficulties in attracting  or  retaining tea  pluckers and rubber
tappers.  Firrns in the EPZ located just a few mniles  out of Colombo report excess demand
for  labor in the  range of several hundred workers each.  The Department of Labour
estimates the total number of vacancies in EPZ firms at around 15,000.  But on the other
23hand,  when  the  government  Post  and  Telecommunications agency  advertised  300
positions, 10,000 candidlates  applied.
7.  Policy  Implications
No policy reforrn will make the unemployment rate decline dramatically in a short
period of time.  Experience in other countries suggests that after a structural shock, such
as  economic liberalization, it  may take  many years  for  the  labor  market  to  adjust.
Countries with a stellar growth performance, such as Chile or Mauritius, had two-digit
unemployment rates for more than one decade after they adopted an outward-oriented
economic strategy; it took  them  roughly two  decades to  reach  full employment.  A
country with a less-than-stellar growth performance, like Sri Lanka, may need longer than
that.  And even in the long run, the unemployment rate  could be higher than in other
countries.  Sri Lanka has a strong and caring family structure, possibly leading to long job
search spells.  Trying to artificially  shorten these spells would not increase the well-beirig
of the population.
However,  the  Sri Lankan  labor market  could be  made  more  efficient than  t
currently is.  Based on the analysis above, reform efforts should aim at removing the
artificial benefits associated with some of the "good" jobs, and at creating the conditioris
for a sustained improvemaent  in the quality of "bad" jobs.  A smaller gap between the twi)
types of jobs would reduce the payoffs to queuing, and therefore shorten the job  searcl.
More specifically, efforts should be concentrated in reforming public sector employmexnt
24and pay policies, in reducing the dispersion in the product market protection enjoyed by
different sectors of the economy, and in amending or circumventing the TEWA.
Reducing  the  dispersion  of  protection  rates  is the  least  controversial of  the
proposed reforms. Current liberalization plans foresee a reduction of the maximum tariff
rate to  15 percent in the coming years, and a reduction in the number of tariff bands, from
three to  two, in the short run.  But tariffs are not the only product market distortion.
Some activities in Sri Lanka are still characterized by legal monopolies, mostly in the
hands of public sector corporations.  This is the case, for instance, with the distribution of
oil products.  Fostering competition in these sectors could also contribute, indirectly, to a
reduction in the premium paid by some artificially  "good" jobs.
There is less agreement on the need to reform public sector employment and pay
policies. Officially, recruitment is now done entirely on the basis of an aggregate score
obtained at a written examination of one or more papers conducted by the Department of
Examinations.  No additional consideration is given to  prior experience, employment or
unemployment.  Moreover, government jobs require 0  levels at the minimum, so that
making public sector jobs less attractive would do nothing to reduce the unemployment
rates  observed  at  lower  levels  of  education  (Alailima, 1991).  However,  there  are
indications that public sector employment has grown substantially,  that hiring has aimed at
reducing unemployment rates among specific population groups, and that  a  significant
portion of those recruited have less than 0 levels.
Table 11 reports employment figures for a series of sectors and occupations over
period 1987-97.  It shows that government employment has expanded steadily over time,
with the armed forces and the education sector accounting for a large proportion of the
25expansion. In principle, 8 years of education are required to be eligible for the army.  As
regards  the education sector, the practice has been to  recruit  university graduates  as
teachers every time the unemployment rate of this group became too  high.  Announced
hiring freezes  have lacked  credibility.  For  instance,  in  1996 the  Samurdhi poverty
alleviation program recruited 35,000 workers on a fix-term basis.  By 1998, about 10,000
of them had been absorbed into the government despite the explicit commitment not to
extend their contracts beyond two years.  Although the public sector as a whole displays a
reduction in employmrent  starting in 1994, this is due to  the transfer of tea estates to the
private sector, not to a change in government hiring policies.
Table  12 presents a  profile of  public sector workers  based  on the  1995 LFS
sample. This table shows that almost one quarter of these workers have less than 0  levels.
Moreover, less than hali' of those with less than 0  levels work in the administration and
defense sector.  It  follows that  public sector  recruitment at  relatively low  levels of
education is not restricted to the armed forces only.  The table also shows that almost 5
percent of the public sector workers have been in their jobs for less than one year.  This
figure implies  that recruitment remains substantial. If this recruitment were done random]  y
among all the unemployed, the probability of landing a public sector job in any given yesir
would be around 8 percent.
The  most  controversial of  the  proposed  policy reforms  concerns  current jolb
security policies.  The TEWA is possibly acting as a deterrent to  create permanent job;,
because  employers do  niot want  to  get  stuck  with workers  if  circumstances were  to
change.  As a result, only those who work in large formal sector firms, and have been witli
the same employer for one year or more, benefit from job security.  The government of S ti
26Lanka has tried to  circumvent the TEWA by implicitly allowing firms in the EPZs to
ignore it.  This approach has been highly successful in creating new jobs,  as shown by
table 12.  But these are mainly perceived as "bad" jobs.  The TEWA is bypassed in the
EPZs by means of a substantial union repression, and a repressive work environment is not
conducive to the creation of "good" jobs.  A potentially better  approach is to  adopt a
more flexible  and expedite separation regime for new hires.
8.  Conclusion
The findings in this paper suggest that unemployment in Sri Lanka is, to a large
extent, voluntary.  The bulk of the unemployed are young, relatively educated individuals
who live with their parents and benefit from family support to  perform an extended job
search. The goal of this search is not just to find a job, but a relatively good job, either in
the public sector or  in private sector activities characterized by substantial protection,
stenmming  from product and labor market regulations.
Voluntary unemployment is not  incompatible with  frustration,  as years  of job
seeking fail to give access to  one of those good jobs.  Action to reduce unemployment,
hence frustration  among the  youth,  is  warranted.  But  understanding the  nature  of
unemployment is important to identify the policy measures that can help. In Sri Lanka, the
problem is not a shortage ofjobs,  but rather the artificial  gap between good and bad jobs.
A similar interpretation has been offered for Egypt, another developing country with an
unusually high unemployment rate (see Assaad, 1997).  It  does not  follow that  action
should be aimed at creating more of the artificially good jobs.  This would only put  a
27burden on the rest of the economy, through additional taxes and distortionary regulations,
thus making bad jobs even worse.
Some of the policies usually recommended to deal with unemployment elsewhere,
and especially in industrial countries, would be ineffective as well.  An unemployment
insurance scheme would not help much, because roughly two  thirds of  the unemployed
never had a job.  Income support mechanisms for the unemployed would not mitigate the
problem either, as in most cases they would lead to a even more extended job search.  And
more training programs should not be expected to make a substantial difference, given that
joblessness does not reflect a failure of the education system.  Efforts should be aimed at
reducing  the  gap  between  good  and  bad  jobs  by  making  product  markets  more
competitive, reducing  excessive job  security and  reforming the  employment and  pay
policies of the government.
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30Table I
Unemployment  Rates by Age (All Country)
Males  Females  All
Weekly basis  Weekly  basis  Weekly basis
Annual  Annual  Annual
Basis  Basis  Basis
Age  Narrow  Broad  (broad)  Narrow  Broad  (broad)  Narrow  Broad  (broad)
15-19  10.33  32.25  31.06  21.60  48.76  52.49  14.26  38.55  38.88
20-24  8.37  27.28  28.70  11.55  46.33  45.64  9.45  34.90  35.36
25-29  3.03  12.67  12.39  7.03  29.51  27.58  4.21  18.26  17.27
30-34  1.19  6.33  6.15  4.55  17.84  15.80  2.18  9.90  9.06
35-39  1.71  4.80  4.13  1.52  9.04  9.89  1.65  6.25  6.08
40-44  0.68  3.21  2.50  0.42  4.51  4.24  0.60  3.62  3.04
45-49  1.20  2.01  2.46  0.80  3.15  3.51  0.37  2.33  2.75
50-54  0.32  1.59  1.61  . 1.99  1.55  0.24  1.69  1.60
55-59  . 1.43  0.49  . 2.13  . . 1.60  0.37
60-64  . 1.20  1.21  . 3.23  1.61  . 1.60  1.29
65-69  . 2.35  1.82  . . 7.50  . 1.89  2.93
All  2.44  9.75  9.46  4.90  21.64  20.58  3.17  13.56  12.94
Note:  The definitions  used for the unemployment  rates are provided in the text.  A dot  is reported for cells with less than 100
observations.Table 2
Average Characteristics of the Sample
by Employment  Status
Employed  Unemployed,  by defihnition
Wage  Weekly  'e1ldy
Individual  cactercs  All  Earners  Broad  N rrDw
Age  (in years)  37.61  35.93  24.93  24.60
Female  0.291  0.321  0.514  0.458
Sri Lankan  Tamil  0.076  0.098  0.046  0.055
Indian  Tamil  0.033  0.046  0.020  0.026
Moor  0.084  0.065  0.096  0.123
Other  non  Sinhalese  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.003
1-5  years  of school  0.175  0.159  0.043  0.081
6-8  years  of school  0.181  0.161  0.101  0.175
9-10  years  of school  0.241  0.219  0.318  0.377
O/L  0.215  0.229  0.320  0.:!41
A/L  0.106  0.135  0.204  0. .1.5
University  degree  or post-graduate  0.035  0.048  0.006  0.10)
Vocational  training  (in years)  0.232  0.269  0.218  0.: 82
Wife  or husband  of household  head  0.137  0.134  0.051  0.034
Son  or daughter  of household  head  0.295  0.318  0.771  0.:38
Other non-household head  0.139  0.169  0.127  0.:154'
Rural  0.292  0.265  0.295  0.- 62;
Estate  0.045  0.069  0.025  0.t 31.
Number  of observations  11666  7085  1735  31t2Table 3
Determinants  of Unemployment
Probit regressions,  based on weekly,  broad definition
of unemployment;  default status = employed
Independent  variables  Urban  Rural  Estate  All
Age  (in years)  -0.2060  ***  -0.2225  ***  -0.3007  ***  -0.2136
(-36.54)  (-25.09)  (-9.741)  (46.62)
Age  squared  0.0020  ***  0.0022  ***  0.0032  ***  0.0021  ***
(27.47)  (18.62)  (7.004)  (35.03)
Female  0.4813  ***  0.3928  ***  0.1108  0.4492  ***
(11.72)  (6.120)  (0.498)  (13.27)
Sri  Lankan  Tamil  -0.4185  ***  0.3291  -0.4777  -0.3993  ***
(-5.534)  (1.000)  (-1.449)  (-5.867)
Indian  Tarnil  -0.6439  ***  -0.1389  -0.2585  -0.4480  ***
(4.291)  (-0.549)  (-0.790)  (-4.247)
Moor  0.0886  0.0918  0.9381  0.0939  *
(1.551)  (0.509)  (1.149)  (1.737)
Other  non  Sinhalese  -0.2180  - - -0.2377
(-1.365)  (1.496)
1-5  years  of school  0.1839  *  0.0019  0.6809  0.1712  **
(1.940)  (0.013)  (1.996)  (2.304)
6-8  years  of school  -0.0617  -0.3541  **  0.7753  *  -0.0814
(-0.568)  (-2.269)  (1.919)  (-0.961)
9-10  years  of school  0.0440  0.0023  0.9621  **  0.1070
(0.433)  (0.016)  (2.389)  (1.346)
OIL  0.2078  **  0.4076  ***  1.170  **  0.3381  ***
(2.017)  (2.708)  (2.317)  (4.156)
A/L  0.1644  0.5718  ***  -0.0536  0.3371  ***
(1.520)  (3.494)  (-0.065)  (3.895)
University  degree  or post-graduate  -0.5774  ***  -0.1689  -0.3970  **
(-2.819)  (-0.468)  (-2.280)
Vocational  training  (in years)  -0.0023  -0.0592  -0.4772  -0.0100
(0.937)  (-1.216)  (0.689)  (0.402)
Wife  or husband  of household  head  0.0934  0.0237  -0.5191  0.0233
(1.040)  (0.179)  (-1.241)  (0.322)
Son  or daughter  of household  head  0.4094  ***  0.2142  **  -0.0592  0.3462  ***
(6.006)  (2.007)  (-0.183)  (6.168)
Other  non-household  head  0.0179  0.0852  -0.5512  0.027  1
(0.238)  (0.683)  (-1.187)  (0.428)




Province  and  quarter  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Number  of observations  12424  5533  837  18797
Pseudo--R 2 0.6451  0.6652  0.7973  0.6534
Note:  Z-values are reported in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficients  at the 10, 5 and I % level
are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively.Table 4
Determinants  of Unemployment
Probit regressions,  based on weekdy,  narrow definition
of unemployment;  default status = employed
Independent  variables  Urban  Rural  Estate  All
Age (in years)  -0.2612  ***  -0.2860 ***  -0.4069 ***  -0.2713 ***
(-32.33)  (-20.47)  (-8.212)  (-10.40)
Age squared  0.0025 **e  0.0028 ***  0.0043 ***  0.0026 ***
(24.63)  (15.18)  (6.846)  (39.90)
Female  0.3532 ***  0.3979 ***  -0.2603  0.3415 ***
(5.663)  (3.916)  (-0.731)  (6.617)
Sri Lankan Tamil  -0.3761 ***  -0.3345  -0.6182  -0.4199 ***
(-3.420)  (-0.556)  (-1.235)  (4.185)
Indian Tamil  -0.2758  -0.2473  -0.6196  -0.3565 **
(-1.389)  (-0.679)  (-1.319)  (-2.404)
Moor  0.2030 **  -0.0285  0.1891 **
(2.449)  (-0.087)  (2.351)
Other non Sinhalese  -0.3875  -0.4660 *
(-1.502)  (-1.783)
1-5 years of school  0.3475 ***  0.1154  1.0547 **  0.3406 ***
(2.918)  (0.538)  (2.131)  (3.474)
6-8 years of school  -0.1138  -0.5606 **  0.9730  -0.1614
(-0.768)  (-2.272)  (1.549)  (-1.340)
9-10 years of school  -0.2081  -0.2307  0.8332  -0.1205
(-1.492)  (-1.006)  (1.310)  (-1.066)
O/L  -0.0350  -0.1583  1.338  O.C  225
(-0.241)  (-0.626)  (1.562)  (0.187)
A/L  -0.1337  -0.2239  -0.11714
(-0.835)  (-0.757)  (-0.527)
University  degree or post-graduate
Vocational training (in years)  -0.0143  0.1009  0.(246
(-0.248)  (1.231)  (0.337)
Wife or husband of household head  -0.2504  0.0149  -0.8495  -0.2310)  *
(-1.343)  (0.050)  (-1.132)  (-1, 376)
Son or daughter of household head  -0.0252  0.1377  -0.5598  -0.0  33
(-0.222)  (0.580)  (-1.132)  (-0 340)
Other non-household  head  -0.3546 ***  0.2376  -1.015  -0.2556 **
(-2.839)  (0.933)  (-1.464)  (-2 384)




Province  and quarter  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  I  es
Number  of observations  11159  5070  780  171i36
Pseudo-R 2 0.8394  0.8693  0.9065  0.8485
Note:  Z-values  are  reported  in parentheses.  Statistically  significant coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  I  'No  level
are indicated by one, two and three asterisks  respectively.Table 5
Lowest Acceptable  Wage over Average  Wage by Age
Males  Females  All
Unemp-
Loyment
defi-  Age  All  All  All
nition  Group  Urban  Rural  Country  Urban  Rural  Country  Urban  Rural  country
15-19  1.89  1.61  1.78  . . . 1.77  1.52  1.69
20-24  1.26  1.52  1.35  1.17  1.25  1.22  1.21  1.39  1.28
Weekly  25-29  1.20  1.41  1.27  1.03  1.25  1.12  1.09  1.30  1.17
Broad
15-64  1.02  1.25  1.10  0.93  1.21  1.05  0.97  1.20  1.05
15-19  . . . . . . 1.68  . 1.61
20-24  1.24  . 1.33  . . 1.12  1.19  . 1.24
Weekly  25-29  . . . . . 1.07  . 1.13
Narrow
15-64  0.99  1.17  1.05  0.88  . 0.96  0.93  1.10  1.00
Note:  A dot is reported for cells  with less than 50 employed  or unemployed  persons.Table 6
Determinants  of Actual and Reservation  Wages (All Country)
OLS regressions;  based on log of wage in first job
and/or log of lowest acceptable  wage;  both in Rs. per month
All employed  Private sector  Unemployed
Independent variables  (actual wage)  (actual wage)  (lowest wage)  Ml
Age (in years)  0.0068  ***  0.0045  ***  0.0061  **  0.0045  ***
(5.881)  (3.093)  (2.356)  (4.268)
Female  -0.2115 ***  -0.2542 ***  -0.1727 ***  -0.1700 ***
(-7.408)  (-6.787)  (-5.569)  (-7.366)
Sri Lankan Tamil  -0.0694  -0.0948 *  0.1074  -0.0654 *
(-1.634)  (-1.789)  (1.434)  (-1.722)
Indian Tamil  0.0229  0.0341  0.2318 *  0.0236
(0.363)  (0.461)  (1.915)  (0.415)
Moor  0.0001  0.0042  0.1104 **  0.0449
(0.002)  (0.073)  (2.144)  (1.201)
Other  non  Sinhalese  -0.4555  ***  -0.5570  ***  0.3114  *  -0.3119  ***
(-3.915)  (-4.056)  (1.900)  (-3.095)
1-5 years of school  0.1201 **  0.1061  -0.1467  0.1454 ***
(2.098)  (1.625)  (-0.747)  (2.709)
6-8 years of school  0.3374  ***  0.3209  ***  -0.0767  0.3888  ***
(5.797)  (4.799)  (-0.405)  (7.196)
9-10 years of school  0.5393  ***  0.4718  ***  -0.0298  0.6091  ***
(9.377)  (7.053)  (-0.161)  (11.51)
O/L  0.8560  ***  0.7009  ***  -0.0361  0.8440  ***
(14.92)  (10.064)  (-0.195)  (15.97)
A/L  1.1049 ***  0.9764 ***  0.1147  1.0628 ***
(18.123)  (11.857)  (0.614)  (19. ;Q'O>
University degree or post-graduate  1.3747 ***  1.2410  *  0.4254  1.371:1 
(18.780)  (8.895)  (1.643)  (20.4:0)
Vocational training (in years)  0.0916 ***  0.0805 ***  0.0059  0.0802 ***
(6.229)  (3.281)  (0.251)  (6.15,8)
Wife or husband of household head  0.0382  -0.0140  0.0066  0.0149
(0.918)  (-0.238)  (0.068)  (0.41  1)
Son or daughter of household head  -0.0555 *  -0.0330  0.0590  -0.01  4X
(-1.703)  (-0.771)  (0.741)  (-0.5' 14,i
Other  non-household  head  -0.1017  ***  -0.1102  ***  0.1218  -0.087. ***
(-2.828)  (-2.383)  (1.437)  (-2.7' 2)
Rural  -0.1664  ***  -0.2056  ***  0.0065  -0.1425  *'*
(-5.899)  (-5.435)  (0.184)  (-5.91  8)
Estate  -0.0619  0.0155  -0.1654  -0.0756
(-1.143)  (0.235)  (-1.527)  (-1.5(5)
Province and quarter dummniies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yei
Number of observations  7085  4793  1733  8811,
Adjusted R 2 0.2022  0.1354  0.0505  0.17:10
Chow  test  10.314  **
Note:  T-values  are  reported in parentheses.  Statistically  significant  coefficients at the  10, 5
and  1 % level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks  respectively.Table 7
Determinants  of Labor Earnings
OLS regressions;  based on log of Rs. per month in first job
Independent  variables  Urban  Rural  Estate  All
Age (in years)  0.0008  0.0070**  0.0090*  0.0017
(0.534)  (2.308)  (1.805)  (1.309)
Experience  (in years)  0.0083***  -0.0024  -0.0039  0.0055***
(4.258)  (-0.664)  (-0.798)  (3.380)
Female  -0.2075***  -0.2175***  -0.1770*  -0.2118***
(-6.048)  (-3.190)  (-1.691)  (-7.070)
Sri Lankan Tamil  0.0425  -0.3578  -0.2429**  -0.0257
(0.938)  (-1.447)  (-2.121)  (-0.6090)
Indian  Tamil  0.0577  0.0730  -0.1937  0.0716
(0.705)  (0.308)  (-1.549)  (1.151)
Moor  0.0191  -0.0227  -0.6888  -0.0114
(0.421)  (-0.127)  (-1.273)  (-0.250)
Other non Sinhalese  -0.4230***  0.1974  -0.4391***
(-3.849)  (0.193)  (-3.812)
1-5 years of school  0.1449*  0.0453  -0.0662  0.0805
(1.842)  (0.369)  (-0.675)  (1.4270)
6-8 years of school  0.3046***  0.2189*  -0.0437  0.2437***
(3.888)  (1.755)  (-0.367)  (4.227)
9-10 years of school  0.3783***  0.3860***  -0.1059  0.3396***
(4.851)  (3.080)  (-0.698)  (5.835)
O/L  0.5909***  0.4204***  0.5868**  0.5172***
(7.424)  (3.170)  (2.449)  (8.522)
A/L  0.7343***  0.4859***  0.4124  0.6484***
(8.613)  (3.150)  (1.065)  (9.621)
University  degree or post-graduate  0.9368***  0.6434***  0.0330  0.8528***
(9.650)  (3.088)  (0.038)  (10.497)
Vocational training (in years)  0.0711***  0.0280  0.2524*  0.0633***
(4.413)  (0.756)  (1.715)  (4.214)
(Continued)Table 7 (Continued)
Independent  variables  Urban  Rural  Estate  All
Wife or husband  of household head  0.0332  -0.1342  0.1584  0.0185
(0.673)  (-1.472)  (1.368)  (0.451)
Son or daughter of household head  -0.0597  -0.0513  0.0736  -0.0580
(-1.605)  (-0.723)  (0.610)  (-1.795)
Other non-household  head  -0.0470  .0.1930**  -0.0605  -0.0736**
(-1.165)  (-2.236)  (-0.365)  (-2.034)
Public sector  job  0.4462***  0.4937***  0.7507***  0.4673***
(7.572)  (4.151)  (3.608)  (9.039)
1 or more years of seniority  0.2800***  0.2333**  0.7047***  0.2944***
(5.497)  (2.459)  (4.156)  (6.582)
Tariff  0.0131***  0.0177***  0.0047  0.0130***
(4.124)  (3.708)  (0.504)  (5.196)
Receives  payments  in kind  -0.1816***  0.0538  0.1718  -0.08657***





Sector, occupation,  province  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yt,s
And quarter dummies
Number of observations  4659  1869  485  70 3
Adjusted  R2 0.2395  0.2381  0.1819  0.24131
Note:  In the 2SLS column, the public sector job and the seniority variables are replaced 'ty their
predicted values, using the district-level  shares of public sector jobs and long-term jobs as
instruments. T-values are reported in parentheses. Statistically  significant  coefficient;;  at the
10, 5 and I % level are indicated  by one, two and three asterisks respectively.Table 8
Determinants  of Labor Earnings Correcting  for Self-Selection  (All Country)
2SLS regressions;  based on log of Rs. per month in first job
Specification
Independent  variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Age (in years)  0.0018  0.0018  0.0018  0.0013
(1.337)  (1.359)  (1.242)  (0.873)
Experience  (in years)  0.0065 ***  0.0064 ***  0.0076 ***  0.0049 *
(3.068)  (2.999)  (4.604)  (1.715)
Female  -0.2164 ***  -0.2161 ***  -0.2187 ***  -0.2018 $**
(-7.149)  (-7.141)  (-7.090)  (-6.206)
Sri Lankan Tamnil  -0.0261  -0.0246  -0.0335  -0.0304
(0.553)  (-0.560)  (-0.765)  (-0.686)
Indian Tamil  0.1019  0.1062  0.0628  0.0588
(1.430)  (1.493)  (0.771)  (0.720)
Moor  0.0157  0.0181  -0.0089  -0.0291
(0.317)  (0.366)  (-0.143)  (-0.458)
Other non Sinhalese  -0.4341  ***  -0.4274 ***  -0.4853  ***  -0.4290  $**
(-3.409)  (-3.363)  (-4.015)  (-3.378)
1-5 years of school  0.0928  0.0925  0.0886  0.0782
(1.636)  (1.630)  (1.552)  (1.348)
6-8 years of school  0.2452 ***  0.2439 ***  0.2506 ***  0.2512 ***
(4.168)  (4.147)  (4.255)  (4.248)
9-10 years of school  0.3223 ***  0.3184 ***  0.3498 ***  0.3642 ***
(4.890)  (4.839)  (4.592)  (4.769)
OIL  0.4820 ***  0.4758 ***  0.5317 ***  0.5541  ***
(6.176)  (6.117)  (5.222)  (5.419)
AAL  0.6117 ***  0.6044 ***  0.6691 ***  0.6863 ***
(6.918)  (6.863)  (5.978)  (6.117)
University degree or post-graduate  0.8033 ***  0.7948 ***  0.8735  ***  0.8987 ***
(7.652)  (7.599)  (6.409)  (6.569)
Vocational  training (in years)  0.0573 ***  0.0569 ***  0.0624 ***  0.0656 ***
(3.711)  (3.690)  (3.696)  (3.839)
(Continued)Table 8 (Continued)
Specification
Independent  variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Wife or husband  of household head  0.0133  0.0120  0.0237  0.0223
(0.312)  (0.281)  (0.547)  (0.512)
Son or daughter  of household head  -0.0450  -0.0441  -0.0525  -0.0:'28 *
(-1.356)  (-1.329)  (-1.329)  (-1.777)
Other non-household head  -0.0722  *  -0.0708 *  -0.0744 *  -0.0860 **
(-1.910)  (-1.874)  (-1.872)  (-2.161)
Public sectorjob  0.3486  *  0.3740  *  0.1995 *  0.5831  **
(1.731)  (1.875)  (6.081)  (2.230)
1 or more years of seniority  -0.0085  -0.0082  0.0406  0.6076
(-0.303)  (-0.291)  (0.104)  (1.182)
Tariff  0.0129 ***  0.0129 ***  0.0128 ***  0.0130 ***
(5.099)  (5.118)  (5.076)  (5.155)
Receives payments  in kind  -0.1035 ***  -0.1038 ***  -0.0945 ***  -0.1045 ***
(-3.442)  (-3.453)  (-3.147)  (-3.  715)
Rural  -0. 1213 ***  -0.1211 ***  -0.1274 ***  -0.1172 ***
(-4.294)  (-4.288)  (-4.525)  (4.1 29)
Estate  0.0106  0.0109  -0.0131  -0.01)21
(0.189)  (0.193)  (-0.230)  (-0.:36)
Sector, occupation,  province  Yes  Yes  Yes  Ye  s
And quarter dummies
Number of observations  7013  7013  7013  7013
Adjusted R 2 0.2346  0.2346  0.2383  0.2348
Note:  The chosen instruments are the shares of the public sector and of jobs with a seniorit) of one
year or more in total  employment  (salaried or not) at the district level.  Only the former
instrument  is used iin  specification  (1); both instruments  are used elsewhere.  In specif cations
(1)  and (2)  only  the public sector job  variable is  replaced by its  predicted valu.e  In
specification  (3) ordy the seniority  variable is replaced.  Both variables are instrumc  nted in
specification  (4).  Statistically  significant  coefficients  at the 10, 5 and 1 % level are indicated
by one, two and three asterisks  respectively.Table 9
Determinants  of Labor Earnings  by Education Level
OLS regressions;  based on log of Rs. per month in first job
Education level
5 years  6 to 10  O/L or  Degree
Independent  variables  or less  years  A/L  or more
Age (in years)  0.0038  0.0025  -0.0011  0.0198 **
(1.440)  (1.181)  (-0.444)  (2.563)
Experience (in years)  0.0004  0.0034  0.0109 ***  -0.0048
(0.112)  (1.205)  (4.000)  (-0.639)
Female  -0.3398 ***  -0.1876 ***  -0.1427 ***  -0.2392
(-4.492)  (-3.476)  (-3.345)  (-1.625)
Sri Lankan Tamil  -0.0822  0.0455  -0.0769  0.0299
(-0.918)  (0.612)  (-1.130)  (0.157)
Indian Tamil  0.0782  0.1222  -0.0428  -0.0260
(0.719)  (1.131)  (-0.270)  (-0.031)
Moor  0.0510  0.0489  -0.1108  -0.2370
(0.408)  (0.688)  (-1.637)  (-1.104)
Other non Sinhalese  0.2711  0.2311  -0.6792 *  -3.978  *
(0.676)  (1.187)  (-4.417)  (-9.355)
Vocational  training (in years)  0.0371  0.0420  0.0615 ***  0.0760 **
(0.469)  (1.248)  (3.420)  (2.215)
Wife or husband  of household head  0.0736  -0.1684 **  0.0068  0.1160
(0.774)  (-2.193)  (0.112)  (0.657)
Son or daughter of household head  -0.0728  -0.0483  -0.1033 **  -0.1328
(-0.860)  (-0.942)  (-2.071)  (-0.798)
Other non-household  head  -0.1743*  -0.0133  -0.1381**  -0.1055
(-1.767)  (-0.232)  (-2.517)  (-0.618)
(Continued)Table 9 (Continued)
Education level
5 years  6 to 10  O/L or  Degree
Independent  variables  or less  years  AIL  or more
Public sector  job  0.6628 *  0.4250 *  0.5218 ***  0.6858 *
(4.471)  (5.134)  (6.756)  (1.942)
1 or more years of seniority  0.3898***  0.1894 ***  0.4266 ***  0.8793 **
Ta(3.481)  (2.879)  (6.047)  (2.466)
Tariff  0.0026  0.0187 ***  0.0164 ***  -0.0131
(0.546)  (4.743)  (3.204)  (-0.478)
Receives payments  in kini  -0.1254**  -0.0951 **  -0.0320  0.3495
(-1.910)  (-1.954)  (-0.661)  (1.527)
Rural  -0.2335 **  -0.0378  -0.1222 *$*  -0.0664
(-2.917)  (-0.848)  (-2.979)  (-DA487)
Estate  0.1836*  -0.2317**  -0.0165  -0.8825
(1.734)  (-2.392)  (-0.122)  (-:1.967)
Sector (if not tradable), occupation,  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Province  and quarter dummies
Number of observations  1452  2674  2552  334
Adjusted  R 2 0.0988  0.1011  0.1748  0. 2213
Note:  T-values  are reported in parentheses. Statistically  significant  coefficients  at the 10, 5  .nd  I %
level are indicated lby  one and two asterisks respectively.Table 10
Effects of Unemployment  on Nominal  Wage Increases
OLS regressions;  with the change in the log of
nominal wages  by sector as the dependent  variable
Specification
Independent  variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Inflation rate (change in log of  0.6495 *  0.6749  ***  0.6370 ***  0.6370  *
Colombo  consumer  prices)  (3.844)  (4.114)  (3.870)  (3.790)
Unemployment  rate (in % of labor force)  0.0010  0.0004  0.0070  0.0070
(0.232)  (0.092)  (1.164)  (1.140)
Unemployment rate x Formal  sector  -0.0022 **  -0.0132 *  -0.0132  *
(-2.432)  (-1.803)  (-1.766)
Independent term  0.0299  0.0511  -0.0415
(0.582)  (0.961)  (-0.513)
Independent  term x Formal sector  0.1580
(1.510)
Sectoral dunmnies  No  No  No  Yes
Number of observations  79  79  79  79
Adjusted R 2 0.1953  0.2442  0.2569  0.2254
Note:  T-values  are reported in parentheses. Statistically  significant  coefficients  at the 10, 5 and I %
level are indicated  by one, two and three asterisks respectively.Table I I
Total Employment by Sectors
In thousands of workers
Public sector  Private sector
[  I  1  1  . Total
Health  Anned  Total  Corporations  Export pro-  employ-
Year  Teachers  Personnel  Forces  Government  & companies  Total (a)  cessing zone  Total  ment
1987  140  29  513  1266  51
1988  140  30  70  536  1289  55
1989  166  37  589  1339  61  3632  4971
1990  178  35  649  1318  71  3633  4951
1991  171  30  568  1307  85  3777  5084
1992  176  32  653  1291  104  3868  5159
1993  187  34  151  676  160  1295  122  3932  5227
1994  188  37  700  160  1325  135  3990  5315
1995  189  40  738  161  1307  233  4126  5433
1996  189  41  235  752  166  1161  242  4374  5535
1997  181  45  762  1072  258  4519  5591
(a)  The decline  in public sector employment  starting in 1994 is due to the privatization  of tea plantations.
Source:  Constructed  with data from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the Department  of Census  and Statistics and Ministry of Finance,  and Kelegama
(1998).Table 12
The Structure  of Employment  in the Public Sector
In percent;  based on the 1995  Labor Force Survey
Education  level
Up  to 5 years  6-8 years  9-10  years  O/L and up  Total
Males  60.7  83.6  83.7  55.9  62.3
Females  39.3  16.4  16.3  44.1  37.7
Total  100.0  100.0  100.00  100.00  100.00
15-19  years  old  5.7  1.4  1.9  0.4  1.0
20-24  years  old  2.5  5.7  13.6  6.2  7.1
25-29  years  old  9.8  8.6  14.4  16.0  15.0
30 years  and  above  82.0  84.3  70.1  77.4  77.0
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Less  than  one  year  seniority  3.3  2.1  5.1  5.0  4.8
One  or more  years  96.7  97.9  94.9  95.0  95.2
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Estates  15.6  10.7  1.3  0.1  1.8
Other  agriculture  13.9  9.3  7.8  4.4  5.8
Transportation  4.9  11.4  19.3  7.4  9.4
Administration  and  defense  40.2  40.0  42.0  31.4  34.1
Education  2.5  2.1  5.9  32.5  24.8
Health  1.6  5.0  9.1  9.2  8.5
Others  21.3  21.4  14.7  15.1  15.7
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
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